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Abstract: When, in the second half of the 1960s, governments and aircraft manufacturers in 
Western Europe discussed a possible joint project called “Airbus”, the markets for civil jet 
aircraft were dominated by two US firms, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas. After a disappointing 
start, Airbus Industrie, founded in 1970, had become a serious competitor only a decade later. 
Since the early 2000s, Airbus and Boeing have been competing head-to-head for market 
leadership for jet aircraft with more than 100 seats. Boeing has persistently complained about 
Airbus receiving loans on favourable terms and other subsidies from European governments, 
and that the latter would use political pressure to make operators buy Airbus aircraft. Based on a 
record of all wide-body jets delivered between 1969 and 1989 and a dataset built thereupon on 
all airlines having acquired a brand-new wide-body, we subject the latter reproach to an 
empirical test by asking for the political determinants of Airbus and Boeing sales. We find 
suggestive evidence for airlines’ ownership status and their home countries’ former colonial ties 
to as well as trade relations with and development aid flows from the Airbus consortium 
member countries and the US to have mattered. 
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How Political Were Airbus and Boeing Sales in the 1970s and 1980s? 
 
1. Introduction 
In the first three decades of its existence, civil aviation was almost entirely determined by 
military and therefore political interests. Owing to the legendary Douglas DC-3, the new 
means of transport gained a certain degree of reliability and, above all, economic viability in 
the mid-1930s making the operation of airplanes lucrative for business purposes. Although, 
after the Second World War, civil aviation profited worldwide from the sale of thousands of 
phased-out US military transporters, it remained a highly political and highly regulated 
industry – in- and particularly outside the United States (e.g., Hickie 1991: 191; McGuire 
1997: 28-33; Lawrence/Thornton 2005: 7-19; and Bowen 2010: 12-18).1 Until the 1980s, 
almost every national flag carrier outside North America was still firmly in the hands of the 
state. Nearly all airlines placed their scheduled flight business in the hands of a cartel, the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) (Bowen 2010: 21, 54). Even within the United 
States, regional monopolies regulated air traffic business into the 1970s. The two large and 
privately owned American international carriers, Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) and 
Trans World Airlines (TWA), were allowed to operate only a few domestic routes, whereas 
airlines with names such as Eastern, Western, Southern or Northwest Orient Airlines (the 
latter with route rights to East Asia) shared most of the domestic market with companies still 
existing today such as American Airlines (AA), Delta Airlines (DA), and United Airlines (UA) 
(Bowen 2010: 18-22).  
With politics still playing an important role in civil aviation, the Airbus consortium was 
a child of its time when it was founded in 1970. France wanted to put a stop to the 
increasing dominance of US aircraft manufacturers with her Concorde, Mercure and now 
Airbus projects. As a junior partner, Germany saw its opportunity to revive its long-standing 
aircraft industry and return to the market for large civil aircraft. The US manufacturers 
initially gave the Airbus project just as little a chance as they had given the Concorde and the 
Mercure (Hayward 1975: 354; McGuire 1997: 37-39; Thornton 1995: 45-66; Andres 1996; 
Kirchner 1998; and Raabe 2020). However, when Airbus’ first major sales successes emerged 
                                                          
1
  We refer to the C-47 and the C-54 and their civilian versions DC-3 and DC-4. 
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in the late 1970s – in late 1977 Eastern Airlines received its first A300s (on a leasing basis)2 – 
accusations of unsound practices became more outspoken. On the one hand, the Americans 
pointed to the large loans on favourable conditions and other, more direct subsidies the 
Airbus consortium received from its member states’ governments; and on the other hand, 
they accused the Europeans of exerting direct political influence on the sale of their new 
aircraft. The Europeans reacted with counter-reproaches and referred to the cross-
subsidisation of US civil aircraft production by military orders. Years of litigation before the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) followed suit (Baldwin/Krugman 1988: 51; Hickie 1991: 
191-193; and McGuire 1997: 48-90).3 
The mutual accusations of political influence on sales are the subject of our article. 
We are interested in the extent to which the accusations were justified and, if so, for which 
manufacturers and periods this applies. Since we do not have access to the relevant source 
material at Airbus or Boeing, we use an indirect empirical approach based on mass data on 
jet deliveries. As Airbus started with two wide-body jets, the A300 and the A310,4 we limit 
ourselves to this market segment. We created a database that covers the years 1969 to 1989 
and contains not only all wide-body aircraft delivered by Airbus, Boeing, Lockheed and 
McDonnell Douglas in that period, but also a number of political variables on the 
characteristics of the ordering airlines and of their respective countries of origin. We 
proceed by briefly discussing the economic and political environment of the market for 
wide-body aircraft in the 1970s and 1980s in Section Two. We turn to our main 
methodological concern, namely, how to measure “political sales” in a mass data setting, in 
Section Three and introduce our data set in Section Four. Section Five is devoted to the 
empirical analysis centring on logit regressions asking for the determinants of airlines’ 
decisions to buy Airbus and Boeing aircraft; the regressions are performed for the entire 
period 1974-1989 as well as for the sub-periods 1974-1979 and 1980-1989 and separately 
for Airbus and Boeing sales. Finally, Section Six serves to establish a lower-bound 
guesstimate of the absolute and relative number of political sales by Airbus and by Boeing. 
 
                                                          
2
  On the importance of Eastern Airlines as a customer for Airbus, cf. Bugos (1996: 394) and McGuire (1997: 
52-54). 
3
  On the subsidy dispute after the 1992 trade agreement between the EC and the US, cf. specifically Pavcnik 
(2002); Carbaugh/Olienyk (2004); Maennig /Wittig (2010); and Olienyk/Carbaugh (2011). 
4
  Airbus’ first narrow-body, the A320, went into service in March 1988. 
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2. The economic and political environment of the wide-body aircraft market from the late 
1960s to the 1980s 
Three major trends dominated the investigation period. Firstly, after the first oil price crisis, 
economic efficiency, especially fuel costs per passenger kilometre, was deemed crucial for 
the success or failure of an aircraft model. Secondly, as worldwide prosperity increased, so 
did the demand for passenger and cargo flights, making wide-bodies profitable in the first 
place. Thirdly, a slow but steady deregulation of the air transport markets took place, 
starting in the United States.  
Deregulation in the United States mainly affected rights to flight routes. Before the 
Airline Deregulation Act signed by US President Jimmy Carter end of October 1978 came into 
force, new routes had been subject to a lengthy approval procedure by the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB). The rest of Western civil aviation was essentially subject to the IATA, a cartel of 
almost all major international airlines, which fixed prices and quality for each individual 
route until the 1990s (McGuire 1997: 42-44; and Bowen 2010: 93). 
Most IATA members outside North America were national flag carriers under public 
ownership over the 1970s and 1980s. One big exception is British Airways (BA), which was 
privatised under the Thatcher government in 1984.5 It is not surprising that publicly-owned 
flag carriers opted for national aircraft types if existing. For years, Air France flew the 
Caravelle twin-jet (1959-1981) on its short- and medium-haul routes. Air Inter, the other 
state-owned French airline, was the only airline to use the Mercure twin-jet (1974-1995), 
built by Dassault. Moreover, Air France was the A300’s launch customer (1974-1997), and Air 
Inter also relied entirely on Airbus aircraft to replace the Mercure (McIntyre 1992: 13-27; 
Béteille 1995; Dienel/Lyth 1998: 18-49; and Bowen 2010: 112).6 BA, created in 1974 by the 
merger of British European Airways (BEA) and British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC), 
relied almost entirely on national turboprop and jet aircraft for short- and medium-haul 
routes and partly also on long-haul routes.7 Air France and BA were also the only airlines to 
buy the prestigious, but enormously fuel-thirsty Concorde which they operated between 
                                                          
5
  Air Canada and Japan Airlines switched to private ownership in the second half of the 1980s, too. 
6
  For an overview of the most important characteristics of the jet aircraft types mentioned here, cf. Table A.1 
in the Appendix. 
7
  On short- and medium-haul routes: Vickers Viscount, Vickers Vanguard, Hawker-Siddeley Trident, and BAC 
1/11; on long-haul routes: Vickers VC-10. 
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1976 and 2003 despite rising kerosene prices and maintenance costs (Dienel/Lyth 1998: 50-
84).  
Medium-sized privately-owned airlines existed in addition to the national flag 
carriers. The French Union de Transport Aériens (UTA) was majority-owned by Chargeurs 
Réunis, one of Europe’s largest shipping groups. Following from the French aviation 
authorities’ (strict) regulation, UTA served long-haul routes not covered by Air France, 
primarily to Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania. With the exception of two Caravelles 
operating in Oceania, UTA flew exclusively US aircraft, mainly DC-8, DC-10 and B747 
freighters. Due to declining profit margins, the majority of shares in the company were sold 
to Air France in 1990 (McGuire 1997: 28-33; and Dienel/Lyth 199: 18-49). British Caledonian 
Airways (BCal), created in 1970/72 by a merger of two private airlines supported by the 
British government, served mainly long-haul routes to South America and Africa, besides a 
couple of European routes. In short- and medium-haul traffic BCal relied entirely on the 
British BAC 1/11 and in long-haul traffic on the Boeing B707 and later the DC-10.8 After 
economic difficulties, the company was sold in 1987 to BA. Ten A320s ordered by BCal in 
1983 were then taken over by BA in 1988 making them the first Airbuses in the BA fleet 
(Dienel/Lyth 1998: 50-84). 
Another example for the conflicts between economic and political motives in the 
aviation business of the 1960sis the case of the Vickers VC-10 of which only 40 civil aircraft 
were built. The launch customer BOAC had to buy a second batch of this model due to 
pressure from the British government, although the company would have preferred to buy 
more aircraft of the more economical B707. With BUA (later BCal), another British company 
opted for the model. The only non-British customers came from the Commonwealth: Ghana 
Airways, Nigeria Airways (cancelled) and East African Airways (based in Kenya) with a total of 
eight actually built aircraft. Later, used VC-10s were leased or sold to Laker Airways (UK), Air 
Malawi and Gulf Air. The latter is based in Bahrain, the only non-Commonwealth airline ever 
flying the VC-10. However, Bahrain was a British protectorate until 1971. 
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  Initially, BCal had taken over two VC-10s of its predecessor company British United Airways (BUA), but 
phased out those aircraft soon thereafter. 
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Illustration 1 
The British Vickers VC-10 
was elegant and popular 
with passengers because of 
the large cabin windows, 
but economically inferior to 
the B707 and the DC-8 (40 
delivered between 1964 
and 1970). 
Photo: British Caledonian Airways 
 
This brief overview suggests that if state-owned airlines had the chance to acquire aircraft 
manufactured in their own country they would have taken it; and, as the VC-10 example 
adds, if they had not shown a sufficient motivation to voluntarily acquire them, they would 
have been pressed by the government. In the United States, where state-owned airlines 
have been unknown ever since, European aircraft manufacturers saw only few sales 
opportunities. The Caravelle was chosen only by UA, which bought 20 of them. The BAC 1/11 
was somewhat more successful and was sold to Mohawk, AA, Braniff and Aloha. Contrasting 
with this, not a single French airline used the BAC 1/11, and no British airline ever the 
Caravelle. 
 
 
Illustration 2 
The French Sud Aviation 
Caravelle was the only 
commercially successful 
non-American passenger jet 
before the Airbus (282 
delivered between 1959 
and 1972). 
Photo: United Airlines 
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From the airlines’ point of view, political guidelines were undesirable as they might have 
interfered with economic efficiency arguments supposed to govern aircraft choice. The first 
oil price crisis in 1973-74 almost doubled the price of kerosene within a year, and at the 
heyday of the second oil price crisis in May 1981 the price of kerosene was almost ten times 
higher than at the beginning of 1973 (see Figure 1). Seemingly ever-increasing jet fuel prices 
led to the phasing-out of numerous less efficient aircraft types. Both the Boeing 720 and the 
Convair Coronado were sold to operators in the periphery or scrapped. The Concorde, which 
had been evaluated and leased by Braniff and Singapore Airlines, did not find any further 
customers beyond Air France and BA. After the second oil price crisis, Lockheed did not find 
new customers for its Tristar and ceased production in 1985 (Argiropoulos 1982; Majumdar 
1987: 509-510). 
 
Fig. 1: Index of monthly kerosene and jet fuel prices, Jan. 1960 to Dec. 1989 (1982 = 100) 
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Index by Commodity for Fuels and Related Products and 
Power: Kerosene and Jet Fuels [WPU0572], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WPU0572, July 29, 2020. 
 
On the one hand, this development disadvantaged Airbus (and its competitors) in that 
potential customers had to record drastic slumps in profits and therefore were forced to 
delay the renewal of their fleets. Worldwide, the number of aircraft orders did indeed 
decrease, and so did the number of deliveries of wide-body aircraft, too (see Figure 2). On 
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the other hand, however, Airbus now benefited from the better efficiency of its A300, being 
the first twin-engine wide-body aircraft. Although the somewhat larger DC-10 and Tristar 
three-engine models had the advantage of being able to cross the Atlantic non-stop and at 
the shortest possible distance until 1985, they nevertheless had higher fuel consumption per 
passenger (DeSantis 2013). 
 
Fig. 2: The market for wide-body jets between 1969 and 1989 
 
Notes: “Total” is the sum of all deliveries of Airbus A300/A310, Boeing B747/B767, Lockheed L-1011, and 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 jets. 
Sources: Our dataset; see Section 4. 
 
In addition, the A300 occupied a market niche. On short- and medium-haul routes, the A300 
with 250 seats in a typical three-class configuration was significantly larger than the largest 
variants of the B727, the B737 or the DC-9 (all single-aisle aircraft) and only slightly smaller 
than the DC-10 or the Tristar (approx. 300 seats each), but with one engine less. This cost 
advantage was reflected in market shares after the second oil price crisis (Figure 3). While 
deliveries of the two three-engine competitor models declined and their market share 
fluctuated by 5 and 10 percent respectively, Airbus was able to increase its market share 
significantly, although Boeing launched the comparatively small B767 in 1982. 
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Fig. 3: Aircraft manufacturers’ market shares in the wide-body segment over 1969-1989 
 
Notes: Based on deliveries per manufacturer. 
Sources: Our dataset. 
 
 
 
Illustration 3 
Pan Am’s order of 30 Airbus 
A300 and A310 aircraft 
were part of Airbus’ final 
breakthrough on the US 
market in the early 1980s 
(561 and 255 delivered 
between 1974 and 2007). 
Photo: Pan American 
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Illustration 4 
Sloppy maintenance led to a 
fatal crash of an American 
Airlines McDonnell Douglas 
DC-10 and a subsequent 
two-month grounding in 
summer 1979, which had a 
serious impact on DC-10 
sales (586 delivered 
between 1971 and 2001). 
Photo: American Airlines 
 
When AA, one of the three very large US domestic airlines, started using the A300 in spring 
1988, Airbus had finally made its breakthrough on the US market.9 Lockheed had already 
retired as a producer of civil aircraft three years earlier, while the DC-10, modernized as the 
MD-11, had little success. In fact, the market for large civil aircraft was now a duopoly 
between Airbus and Boeing. 
 
3. A “political sale” – what it is and how to measure it 
The factors having enabled Airbus to seriously compete with Boeing by 1989 have been 
intensely debated. Some authors emphasise that the A300/A310 was technologically 
superior to American aircraft and designed to fill a market niche not yet served. Irrespective 
of the subsidy/government support issue, airlines bought Airbus aircraft primarily for 
reasons of economic efficiency in air traffic (Majumdar 1987: 502-506; Sarathy 1993: 136).10 
Others stress that, to understand Airbus’ rise, it is necessary to make a clear distinction 
between the “market” and the “nonmarket” environment within which commercial aircraft 
production takes place. Airbus’ success owes at least as much to nonmarket strategies, or 
factors, as it does to market-related ones (Hickie 1991: 192; Sandholtz/Love 2001; and 
Crombez/Van Kerckhoven/Van Gestel 2011). Following Sandholtz and Love (2001: 150),  
                                                          
9
  US customers of the A300/A310 according to our dataset (until 1989) and Wikipedia thereafter (year of first 
delivery in parentheses): Eastern Airlines 34 A300 in total (1977); Pan Am 12 A300 (1984) and 18 A310 
(1985); Continental Airlines 3 A300 (1986); and American Airlines 35 A300 (1988).  
10
  Related to this argument is the idea that Airbus’ success fundamentally builds on organizational innovation, 
too (e.g., Kechidi 2013).  
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 [n]onmarket strategies include subcontracting and, […], coproduction offers; 
investment in local training or maintenance facilities; strategic manipulation of 
forecasts; diplomatic pressure applied by institutions such as the European Commission 
(EC), European leaders and trade representatives; and lobbying and even bribery of 
airline officials.11  
 
And Sandholtz and Love (2001: 152-153) more concretely on Airbus: 
Since Airbus competes in a highly visible, important trade sector and is a consortium 
composed of nationally owned aerospace companies, it should be no surprise that 
diplomatic pressure, often at the highest levels, is utilized to improve Airbus’ fortunes. 
For example, the French government has often linked inducements such as landing 
rights, technical assistance, and special trade agreements to the purchase of Airbus 
transports. Indeed, even in the early years of Airbus, Boeing executives and U.S. govern-
ment officials repeatedly complained about Airbus’s “government-to-government-type 
selling effort. 12 
 
Combining both views, we may distinguish sales deals along two lines, namely whether or 
not a deal materializes because economic efficiency considerations guided the buyer’s 
choice in the first place (buyer’s motivation); and whether or not it is government 
involvement facilitating the closing of the deal between seller and buyer (government 
intervention). Figure 4 is an attempt at establishing a simple (ex-post) classification of sales 
deals along these lines. 
For the purpose of this investigation, we define a sales deal to be “political” if, and 
only if, intervention of the governments standing behind seller and buyer is consciously 
involved in the closing of a specific deal. This intervention can take two forms: It can take a 
moderate form in which a government promotes a domestic seller’s success on the world 
market by granting direct or indirect subsidies (non-repayable grants, favourable credit 
terms, export finance) or by intermediating on its behalf through its relations to the 
potential customer’s home government (Newhouse 1983: 59-66). Governments furnish their 
diplomatic channels to ease communication between both parties and may serve as 
(financial or legal) guarantors of the deal while economic efficiency considerations on the 
buyer’s side prevail (Type B).13 The less moderate form of government intervention is given if 
the seller’s government exerts pressure on the buyer’s government which passes the 
                                                          
11
  For a related definition of a firm’s or a business’s “political behavior”, cf. Boddewyn (1993: 85-86).  
12
  For corruption in the aircraft business, cf. “Airbus’s secret past”, The Economist, June 12, 2003; and “Airbus 
agrees to pay a huge fine to settle a bribery case“, ibid., January 31, 2020.  
13
  On the function as guarantor, cf. Newhouse (1983: 194). 
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pressure right on to the buyer itself. The seller’s government might use diplomatic or 
financial leverage merely to support its domestic business or because it has a stake of its 
own in the game. Alternatively (or in addition) the pressure on the buyer might (partly) lead 
right back to genuine interests of its own government. The involvement of political pressure 
is equal to the buyer’s motive of ensuring economic efficiency to have factually faded into 
the background (Type C). 
  
Fig. 4: Political versus non-political sales 
                                                                      
                                  Governments 
Economic                         involved 
efficiency 
guiding principle 
 
 
No 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Type A sale 
 
“classic market deal” 
 
 
Type B sale 
 
“intermediating governments” 
 
 
 
No 
 
Type D sale 
 
“corruption” 
 
 
Type C sale 
 
“political pressure” 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ own depiction. 
 
In contrast, sales of type A and D are closed without government intervention but could 
nonetheless involve other nonmarket strategies, with bribery probably being the most 
extreme strategy of all nonmarket-non-government-reliant strategies. All four types of sales, 
of course, reflect ideal types. In reality, there might well be a sales deal involving 
intermediating-only governments, but also a nonmarket strategy modifying the buyer’s 
motivation to buy. The grey-shaded area in Figure 4 is supposed to indicate that there might 
be some overlap. 
Note that (full) state ownership of the involved firms is not a necessary precondition 
for a sale to be political; it is a catalyst significantly raising the likelihood of a type C sale to 
happen though. State ownership of the buyer facilitates political pressure to find its way into 
12 
 
the buyer’s management and therefore decision-making process.14 Also note that there is 
another latent motive to buy, namely taste (Irwin/Pavcnik 2004: 226). In its broadest sense, 
taste may, for example, include the phenomenon that countries, or for that matter: firms, 
have deeper trade relations with geographically or culturally close partners. In the same 
vein, states may feel more sympathetic with states that match their own political attitudes 
or agendas and may be, thus, more likely to establish trade relations with these countries.15  
Classifying each and every sale or, respectively, order by drawing on material from 
the manufacturers’, customers’ and governments’ archives would be the ideal way to work 
out an answer to our research question. However, the effort would be tremendous, and 
given the high incidence of proven and suspected corruption in the aircraft business, it is 
extremely unlikely that we could get access to the documents. Therefore, we go the 
cheaper, since indirect, statistical road which, however, has not yet been taken by 
researchers.16 We seek insights into how far Airbus and Boeing sales might have been 
political from a bird’s eye perspective. We therefore need to measure aspects of sales’ 
(potential) political nature. We consider four aspects: 1) an airline’s ownership status (fully 
state-owned vs. mixed public-private ownership vs. fully privately-owned);17 2) historical 
colonial ties of an airline’s home country with France, Great Britain, and the United States;18 
the economic, economic-historical, and political science literatures have assembled evidence 
that past colonial relations do matter long after a colony gains its independence and that a 
mother country may well keep diplomatic and financial control, and thus leverage, to a 
degree (e.g., Grier 1999; Acemoglu/Johnsin/Robinson 2001; Lange 2004; Asongazoh 2010; 
                                                          
14
  As Newhouse (1983: 30) puts it concretely, “[g]overnment of a good many of Europe’s airlines and airplane 
manufacturers gives the Airbus consortium an apparent advantage.”  
15
  A nice example is the travel of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing through the Middle East in March 
1980 during which he promoted, among others, Palestinians’ right for self-determination. Middle Eastern 
states basically caught this to be an anti-Israeli sentiment. In the following, several Middle Eastern airlines 
(e.g. Emirates, Kuwait Airways, Saudia) turned to Airbus and placed highly welcomed orders (Newhouse 
1983: 39-40). While these sales are certainly political, they were so in a very broad sense best put under the 
header of “(political) taste” (unless one could prove that Giscard d’Estaing said what he said for reasons of 
promoting domestic business in the first place). Our definition, however, is narrower. 
16
  A non-statistical alternative would be to concentrate on a manageable number of case studies. But that 
would probably not add much to the existing literature.  
17
  To motivate this aspect: Hickie (1991: 192), states that “[p]olitical pressures are also sometimes applied to 
such airlines [i.e., national airlines; the authors], and even to the airlines of client states, in order to make 
them buy particular aircraft.” 
18
  To motivate this aspect: Consider the case of jets built in Western Europe, especially the Vickers VC-10 
discussed above. 
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Austin 2010; Lee/Schultz 2012; and Maseland 2018); 3) international trade relations 
between an airline’s home country and the Airbus consortium member countries as well as 
the US; we consider trade structure as a measure of “trading partner taste” and bilateral 
trade position (net surplus or deficit) as a possible trigger for trade tensions and 
governments’ countermeasures;19 and, finally, 4) development aid flows from the Airbus 
consortium member countries as well as the US to an airline’s home country; like financial 
flows from the former colonial master to its former colony; development aid flows provide 
leverage, but may also trigger a feeling of being obligated to the aiding country (e.g. Imbeau 
1989; Lumsdaine 1993; Schraeder/Taylor/Hook 1998; Alesina/Dollar 2000; Berthélemy 
2006). 
 
Our main hypotheses are as follows: 
- H1.1: Airbus (Boeing) sold significantly more (less) likely to state-owned airlines than 
to privately-owned ones; 
- H2.1: Airlines from former French and British (US) colonies significantly more likely 
bought Airbus (Boeing) aircraft; 
- H3.1: The larger the weight of the Airbus consortium member countries (the US) as 
trading partner(s) of a country, the more likely did an airline of that country buy 
Airbus (Boeing) aircraft.  
- H4.1: The larger the development aid flows from the Airbus consortium member 
countries (the US) to a receiving country, the more likely did an airline of that country 
buy Airbus (Boeing) aircraft.  
We will discuss the sources of our data on these aspects in the next section and the variables 
created from these data in Section Five. 
 
                                                          
19
  To motivate this aspect: Sandholtz and Love (2001: 153-154), state that “Boeing currently has about 80 
percent of the Japanese market, far above its global market share. In addition, the flag carrier, JAL [Japanese 
Airlines; the authors], has an all-Boeing fleet. The EC has pressured Japan to buy more Airbuses, complaining 
that JAL had never purchased Airbus offerings – and had purchased the 737-400 without even considering 
the A320 – and that ANA [All Nippon Airways; the authors] cancelled Airbus, but not Boeing, orders. The 
imbalance in Japanese aircraft orders is almost certainly tied to political factors, especially Japan’s desire to 
avoid trade tensions with the United States. Purchasing Boeing planes is one way of reducing Japan’s trade 
surplus.” Note that Japan specifically had a large and persistent trade surplus with the US in the 1970s and 
1980s, and that JAL and ANA were already then two of the most important non-American Boeing customers; 
cf. footnote 20. 
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4. Data 
In a first step, we created a dataset on the level of the delivered aircraft covering all wide-
body deliveries between 1969, when the B747 entered the scene, and 1989. We recorded 
2,215 deliveries of wide-body jets to, overall, 145 different first customers – 131 passenger 
airlines, five cargo airlines and nine governmental/miscellaneous customers – from 77 
countries.20 Table 1 shows the composition of this baseline dataset by manufacturer, aircraft 
type, and airline; while the Airbus, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas models have been 
produced beyond 1989, the Lockheed Tristar was exclusively delivered in the 1970s and up 
until 1985. The ten largest customers account for no less than 845 deliveries, equalling a 
share of 38.1 percent in total deliveries.21 By definition, the first customer is the first the 
passenger airline, cargo airline or miscellaneous customer to use a particular, newly-
manufactured aircraft.22 
 
Tab. 1: Baseline wide-body aircraft dataset, 1969-1989 
      
Manufacturer/Aircraft type Observed 
over 
No. of deliveries No. of different customers per 
manufacturer/aircraft type
a
 
      
      
Airbus 1974-1989   484   67  
     A300 1974-1989  321  47 
     A310 1983-1989  163  30 
      
Boeing 1969-1989 1,036   91  
     B747 1969-1969  755  74 
     B767 1982-1989  281  35 
      
Lockheed L-1011 (Tristar) 1972-1985   249   20  
      
McDonnell-Douglas DC-10 1971-1989   446   52  
      
      
Total 1969-1989 2,215  145
b 
 
      
 
Notes: 
a
 Customers include passenger airlines, cargo airlines, and miscellaneous users. 
b
 The sum total does not 
equal the sum over the sub-entities as the sub-entities involve double counts of customers.  
Sources: Authors’ own depiction. 
                                                          
20
  This category includes military (e.g. US Air Force) as well as non-military governmental (e.g., Abu Dhabi Amiri 
Flight) customers and one miscellaneous customer (i.e., General Electric). In case of a merger, we counted 
the merged airlines and the newly created airline separately; so, for example, Germanair (first German A300 
customer) and Bavaria Germanair (created by merger of Germanair and Bavaria Fluggesellschaft in 1977, 
and acquired by Hapag-Lloyd in 1979). 
21
  These are (total wide-body deliveries in parentheses): American Airlines (121), Japan Airlines (101), Pan Am 
(86), United Airlines (84), Delta Airlines (83), All Nippon Airways (80), Lufthansa (78), Eastern Airlines (72), 
TWA (71), and Air France (69). 
22
  In other words, focus is on the primary market for wide-bodies only, leaving the market for used aircraft 
aside. 
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We arrived at the numbers of 2,215 deliveries and 145 customers as a consequence of few 
adjustments we had to perform on the original data.23 These adjustments concern the way a 
particular aircraft’s first customer was recorded in our source. Starting from the various 
production lists showing, in total, 2,255 aircraft, we first eliminated all aircraft “not built” 
(37) and all aircraft built for test purposes only (3); all remaining aircraft entered our 
database.24 As regards the clarification of the first customer, 55 deliveries posed a challenge 
as aircraft are concerned which were not taken up by the originally ordering airline, possibly 
for reasons of illiquidity, insolvency, or merger. While we do know the originally ordering 
airlines, we decided to select as first customer the effective first user.25 
We have collected the following basic information per delivered aircraft from our 
main source: Manufacturer serial number (MSN), manufacturer, model family/type, version 
(e.g., A300B4), main aircraft purpose (passenger, cargo, miscellaneous), first customer, first 
registration, exact delivery date, first customer’s home country, first customer’s commercial 
purpose (passenger/cargo airline, or miscellaneous), and first customer’s founding date.  
We added further binary-coded variables on the airline- and on the home country-
level (see Table 2 in the subsequent section). These include an airline’s ownership status at 
the point in time of the delivery;26 whether an airline’s home country was member of the 
Airbus consortium or was the United States; an airline’s home country’s broad geographical 
location; whether an airline’s home country has historical colonial ties to either France, 
Great Britain, or the USA;27 and whether an airline’s home country was a member of the 
British Commonwealth at the time of delivery. 
                                                          
23
  Our principle sources were the production lists to be found at the internet sites www.planespotters.net (all 
manufacturers except for Lockheed) and www.airfleets.net (Lockheed). 
24
  A modest number of 21 deliveries were recorded as leases (based on an explicit remark in the production 
list) and 2,139 deliveries as buys (based on the absence of any remark as to a potential lease).We assume 
that the actual number of leases must be larger than 21 though. For example, the deliveries of the A300 to 
Eastern Airlines, which in fact were based on a favourable leasing arrangement (“fly before you buy” 
(Lawrence/Thornton 2005: 65), were not equipped with such a remark.  
25
  For example, the A300 with the Manufacturer Serial Number “9” was originally ordered by Air Siam but 
effectively delivered to Air France in July 1976. Of these 55 deliveries, another seven were highlighted as 
leases (five alone to Pan Am). 
26
  We extracted that information from the airline histories as deposited in Wikipedia. For all but four airlines, 
ownership status remained constant throughout the observation period; Air Canada, British Airways, and 
Japan Airlines switched from state (via mixed) to private ownership in the 1980s, and Philippine Airlines 
switched from private to mixed ownership in 1976.  
27
  We focused on the last colonial master and ties sustaining into the recent past. For the latter fact, we do not 
consider a country’s former colonial ties to Spain or Germany. 
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In a second step, we created a dataset on the airline-level to perform logit 
regressions of an airline’s binary choice to buy, or not to buy, Airbus or Boeing aircraft (see 
Table 3 in the subsequent section). For each of the 145 airlines, and separately for the 
periods 1974-1989, 1974-1979, and 1980-1989, we observed whether or not an airline had 
been Airbus or Boeing customer; and how many Airbus and Boeing aircraft it had possibly 
bought. On this level of aggregation, we added trade variables28 and development aid 
variables29 referring to an airline’s home country to account for trade structure and trade 
position as well as financial leverage. We will discuss these variables in detail in the 
subsequent section. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
Our analysis consists of two parts. We begin with a simple descriptive inquiry into the 
distribution of the aircraft deliveries’ characteristics in our baseline dataset; to the best of 
our knowledge, a comparable statistical exercise has not yet been done in the literature. This 
is followed by an inferential exercise on the airline-level asking for the determinants of the 
decision to buy Airbus or Boeing wide-body aircraft in the observation period using logit 
regressions; such an exercise has not yet been attempted in the literature either. 
To begin with, Table 2 shows the results of a number of statistical t-tests on 
differences in sample means regarding an airline’s ownership status, the broad geographical 
location of its home country, and the presence of colonial ties of its home country to the 
manufacturer countries. For the observation period as a whole, we compare the sample of 
Airbus deliveries with the sample of all American manufacturers’ deliveries, in general, and 
with Boeing deliveries, in particular. Is the reported difference in sample means statistically 
significant and positive (negative), this implies that the respective variable’s mean in the 
Airbus sample is larger (smaller) than the mean in the American manufacturer sample. Since 
all displayed variables are 0-1-coded dummy variables, this is equal to saying that the 
                                                          
28
  Our main source for international trade data – i.e., bilateral import and export flows – is the Correlates of 
War Project’s Trade Data Set as described in Barbieri/Keshk (2016). Online: http://correlatesofwar.org, and 
Barbieri/Keshk/Pollins 2009). 
29
  Our main source on development aid flows from is the OECD. We focused on what the OECD labels “total 
official development flows (ODF)”. To be precise, we recorded total receipts of ODF for each receiving 
country in our dataset and ODF granted by the Airbus consortium member states and by the US to calculate 
the shares; see https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BTDIXE. We considered direct aid flows 
between, for example, France and a receiving country here; total ODF includes these unilateral flows as well 
as flows channeled through supranational organizations. 
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proportion of deliveries exhibiting a specific characteristic is significantly higher (lower) in 
the Airbus sample.  
 
Tab. 2: T-tests on differences in sample means on the aircraft-level for the period 1974-1989 
   
Selected binary variables Airbus vs. American 
manufacturers 
Airbus vs. Boeing 
   
   
Buyer’s ownership   
   
     Private ownership –0.119*** (0.025) –0.092*** (0.027) 
     Public ownership 0.123*** (0.026) 0.112*** (0.028) 
     Mixed ownership –0.004       (0.763) –0.020       (0.015) 
   
Buyer’s geographical origin   
   
     Airbus member country 0.092*** (0.020) 0.085*** (0.021) 
     European 0.118*** (0.024) 0.121*** (0.025) 
     Central and South American / Caribbean –0.018**   (0.008) –0.015*     (0.009) 
     North American –0.149*** (0.023) –0.055**   (0.024) 
     African 0.031*** (0.012) 0.024*     (0.013) 
     Middle Eastern 0.039**   (0.016) 0.030*     (0.017) 
     Southern Asia 0.033*** (0.010) 0.034*** (0.010) 
     South Eastern Asia 0.063*** (0.016) 0.052*** (0.018) 
     Eastern Asia –0.084*** (0.017) –0.014*** (0.020) 
     Oceanic –0.033*** (0.008) –0.054*** (0.010) 
   
Buyer’s Colonial ties   
   
     To Airbus member countries 0.026       (0.023) –0.026       (0.025) 
     To US 0.006       (0.242) 0.005       (0.005) 
     Commonwealth member –0.020**   (0.020) –0.061*** (0.022) 
   
   
 N = 1,810 N = 1,294 
   
 
Notes: t-test on equality of mean across groups. Unequal variance in the groups assumed. Reported are the 
differences in sample means and the standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are as follows: * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Sources: Authors’ own computations.  
 
The tests’ implications are as follows: 1) The proportion of deliveries to privately-owned 
airlines is larger in the American manufacturer samples, while the proportion of deliveries to 
state-owned airlines is larger in the Airbus sample; there is no statistically significant 
difference regarding deliveries to airlines with mixed ownership. 2) The proportion of 
deliveries to Airbus consortium member countries is larger in the Airbus sample. 3) The 
proportion of deliveries to airlines from Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Southern Asia, and 
South Eastern Asia (deliveries to the last three form the “Silk Road” deliveries; Newhouse 
1983: 38; Lynn 1995: 160-189) is generally larger in the Airbus sample, and largest for 
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deliveries to airlines from Europe. 4) The proportion of deliveries to airlines from Central and 
South America and the Caribbean, North America, East Asia, and Oceania is generally larger 
in the American manufacturer samples; with the exception of Oceania, this distribution is 
less pronounced in the Boeing subsample. 5) There is no statistically significant difference in 
sample means when looking at colonial ties to Airbus member countries (when put together) 
or to the United States. 6) The proportion of deliveries to airlines from Commonwealth 
countries (including but not exhausted by former British colonies) is larger in the American 
manufacturer samples, and larger in the Boeing subsample compared to all American 
manufacturers.30 
Suggestive as these results might be – they seem to clearly confirm our hypothesis 
H1.1 and reject H2.1 –, they should be interpreted with caution. For example, all US and 
most North American airlines were privately-owned; hence it is not clear whether ownership 
mattered or geographical origin. This results from the fact that the variables for which we 
reproduce the t-test results in Table 2 are not independent from each other. For this reason, 
we augment our univariate analyses summarized in Table 2 by a multivariate logit analysis. 
Logit regressions on the airline level stand at the core of our subsequent analysis because 
they allow simultaneously estimating key (political) variables’ effect on the airlines’ decision 
to buy or not to buy Airbus or Boeing aircraft at all.31 We restrict ourselves to focus on the 
simple binary response here (buy or not) for the reason that coupling or weighting the 
decision to buy with the number of bought aircraft raises additional statistical challenges 
that we want to leave aside for the moment.32 Table 3 shows six regressions arranged into 
three models; regressions are estimated separately for Airbus and Boeing – for the full 
                                                          
30
  We also performed the t-tests year-by-year to bring in greater detail. Results are given in graphical form in 
the Appendix. See the notes to Figure A.1 for how to read our graphical presentation. 
31
  On logit regression, see e.g. Feinstein/Thomas (2002: 384-418); and Wooldridge (2002: 453-481). Logit 
regression is in our view the least complex regression design we can possibly implement given our data 
structure. We can think of numerous ways to extend the framework, beginning with an extension of our 
wide-body dataset into the present, by including narrow-bodies and also the secondary market for aircraft, 
and, on the statistical side, by using more complex count and panel models to make better use of the 
information embedded in our data. 
32
  For one, we would have to consider more complex count data models (without or with time dimension). 
Secondly, in our view the decisions to buy aircraft of different manufacturers are not statistically 
independent from one another. The more aircraft an airline buys from one manufacturer (in a given market 
segment and period), the more likely it supposedly is to not also buy aircraft from another manufacturer. In 
statistical terms, we are likely facing here what the literature calls competing risks (the event happening 
earlier alters the probability of the other event to occur; hence there is a joint probability distribution to 
consider). To be precise, this challenge already exists when looking, as we do, at the binary response in a 
given period. But we think this challenge’s impact on results is negligible in our setting. 
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observation period (model 1), and the 1970s (model 2) and 1980s (model 3).33 All models 
include a number of variables on airline characteristics (upper part) and variables on the 
characteristics of the airlines’ home country (lower part). All variables except for the airlines’ 
founding year and the trade and development aid variables are dummy variables. Since the 
trade and aid variables inevitably exhibit empty cells for the Airbus consortium member 
countries and the United States, their inclusion leads to all observations on airlines from the 
respective countries being dropped; our regressions are thus run on 102 (1974-1989 and 
1980-1989) and 95 (1974-1979) observations only.34 For each variable we report the 
estimated logit coefficient along with its statistical significance, the coefficient’s (clustered 
robust) standard error in parentheses, and an estimate of the marginal effect in brackets. 
For reasons of interpretation, it is much more meaningful to look at the marginal effects 
than at the coefficients themselves.35 The marginal effect can be interpreted as the change 
in the ex-post-probability of becoming an Airbus or Boeing customer given a pre-defined 
change in the explanatory variable; for dummy variables, marginal effects report the change 
when the variable’s value switches from zero to one, and for continuously defined variables 
they are evaluated at the respective variable’s sample mean. Note that double-digit 
coefficients indicate that the variable is a perfect predictor meaning that the variable does 
not exhibit variation. We kept these variables for the sake of illustration though. This 
“problem” is especially present in model 2 on Airbus, which leads to the marginal effects 
being corrupted. 
Manufacturer relations variables:36 Airlines not having ordered any Boeing (narrow- 
or wide-body) aircraft before 1974 (when A300 deliveries started) whatsoever – these are 57 
airlines in our dataset – were more than 20 percent less likely than airlines having had long-
standing relations with Boeing to order Airbus or Boeing wide-bodies during 1974-1989. 
When breaking down the analysis to sub-periods, the effect shows for Airbus in the period 
                                                          
33
  The results on the mean comparison tests performed year-by-year (see the Appendix) suggest that it makes 
sense to make a cut between 1979 and 1980 rather than before or after. Note that some observed airlines 
were founded only after 1979. This is why the number of observations is lower in model 2. 
34
  We additionally ran regressions on the full 145 observations under exclusion of these variables. For reasons 
of space, we do not display the results here, but make them available upon request. 
35
  The influence of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable is not linear in a logit model. It also 
depends on the other explanatory variables’ values. That is, a variable’s influence critically depends on which 
point in the distribution it is measured at. 
36
  These two dummy variables along with a third one which we dropped to avoid multicollinearity (Boeing 
customer before 1969) are supposed to capture path dependency effects. The dropped dummy variable 
constitutes the base case. 
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1980-1989 but not before; for Boeing it shows only in the 1970s, but not thereafter. It is also 
in the 1970s that airlines that had just established relations to Boeing between 1969 and 
1973 (since they were buying narrow-bodies or the new B747 or a combination of both) – 
these are 31 airlines in our dataset – were also less likely to become (or remain) a Boeing 
wide-body customer between 1974 and 1979. On a substantive level, airlines that had 
exclusive relations with McDonnell Douglas before 1974 (or, for that matter, with Lockheed 
since 1972) had little incentive to switch to Boeing models. These airlines predominantly had 
operated a mix of DC-8 and DC-9 jets and at first found a reasonable wide-body extension in 
the DC-10, Tristar, or the A300/310. This changed in the 1980s, when the A300/310 
obviously became significantly less(!) attractive to many of these airlines. This is a somewhat 
surprising observation as the common narrative attributes Lockheed’s market exit and the 
insignificance of the DC-10 by the mid-1980s to the rise of Airbus in the first place. But it 
seems that the increasing attractiveness of Boeing aircraft, and very likely of the B767 twin-
jet appearing in 1982, helped on an equal scale to bury its fellow American competitors. 
 
 
llustration 5 
The Boeing B767 became a 
serious competitor for the 
slightly larger DC-10 and 
Tristar tri-jets, all the more 
when ETOPS regulation was 
relaxed in the mid-1980s so 
that twin-engine jets could 
cross the North Atlantic and 
the North Pacific on fuel-
efficient routes (up to now 
1,190 delivered between 
1982 and June 2020). 
Photo: All Nippon Airways 
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Tab. 3: Determinants of an airline’s decision to buy Airbus or Boeing wide-body aircraft in the period 1974 to 1989 
         
Variables Model 1: 1974-1989  Model 2: 1974-1979  Model 3: 1980-1989 
         
 Airbus Boeing  Airbus Boeing  Airbus Boeing 
         
         
Airline characteristics         
         
Boeing customer after 1969 +0.15        (0.90) 
[+4.0 %] 
–1.31        (0.80) 
[–25.8 %] 
 –0.28       (0.50) 
[–0.0 %] 
–1.49**    (0.58) 
[–24.8 %] 
 –0.05        (0.97) 
[–1.3 %] 
–0.24        (0.92) 
[–5.3 %] 
No Boeing customer pre-1974 –1.01***  (0.33) 
[–24.0 %] 
–1.23*      (0.63) 
[–21.3 %] 
 –1.81       (1.24) 
[–0.2 %] 
–2.83*      (1.50) 
[–50.0 %] 
 –0.95***  (0.20) 
[–21.3 %] 
–0.37        (0.50) 
[–8.2 %] 
Foundation year +0.03***  (0.01) 
[+0.7 %] 
–0.01        (0.01) 
[–0.2 %] 
 +0.07**   (0.03) 
[+0.5 %] 
–0.01        (0.01) 
[–0.2 %] 
 +0.03**    (0.01) 
[+0.5 %] 
–0.00        (0.01) 
[–0.1 %] 
Cargo airline –17.42***  (0.68) 
[–47.5 %] 
+15.61***  (1.18) 
[+24.0 %] 
 –17.50              (.) 
[–0.2 %] 
+3.49        (2.54) 
[+65.1 %] 
 –15.53***  (0.76) 
[–44.0 %] 
+15.81***  (1.09) 
[+40.0 %] 
Governmental customer –1.30**    (0.61) 
[–35.2 %] 
–0.14        (0.90) 
[–2.4 %] 
 –15.39***  (1.22) 
[–0.3 %] 
+0.96        (0.99) 
[+31.9 %] 
 –1.69**    (0.71) 
[–28.7 %] 
–0.64***  (0.16) 
[–15.2 %] 
Full state ownership +0.81        (0.71) 
[+18.4 %] 
+0.59        (0.67) 
[+10.3 %] 
 –0.03        (0.84) 
[–0.0 %] 
+0.89        (0.84) 
[+18.2 %] 
 +1.64**    (0.76) 
[+33.7 %] 
+0.22        (0.52) 
[+5.0 %] 
Mixed ownership +1.17        (0.98) 
[+28.3 %] 
+0.63        (0.83) 
[+8.8 %] 
 –16.39***  (0.73) 
[–0.5 %] 
+2.59*      (1.56) 
[+56.9 %] 
 +1.86**    (0.94) 
[+43.0 %] 
+0.76        (1.20) 
[+24.7 %] 
Switching ownership –16.94***  (0.81) 
[–47.3 %] 
+14.70***   (1.39) 
[+26.0 %] 
 –17.46               (.) 
[–0.1 %] 
+16.67***  (0.81) 
[+77.6 %] 
 –15.45***  (0.85) 
[–44.0 %] 
+15.99***  (1.31) 
[+41.1 %] 
         
Home country characteristics         
         
Former French colony –2.25**     (1.01) 
[–36.5 %] 
+0.01        (0.95) 
[+0.2 %] 
 –18.11***  (1.90) 
[–0.6 %] 
+2.21*      (1.51) 
[+55.5 %] 
 –2.04**     (0.90) 
[–32.9 %] 
–1.45***  (0.30) 
[–34.6 %] 
Former British colony –0.96***   (0.32) 
[–22.0 %] 
–0.77*       (0.40) 
[–13.3 %] 
 –1.00        (0.77) 
[–0.1 %] 
–1.06***  (0.36) 
[–20.6 %] 
 –0.79**     (0.32) 
[–17.7 %] 
+0.12        (0.48) 
[+2.6 %] 
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Tab. 3 continued 
         
Variables Model 1: 1974-1989  Model 2: 1974-1979  Model 3: 1980-1989 
         
 Airbus Boeing  Airbus Boeing  Airbus Boeing 
         
         
Former US colony +17.04***  (1.06) 
[+64.8 %] 
+13.52***  (1.72) 
[+23.1 %] 
 +35.99***  (1.81) 
[+99.9 %] 
+14.39***  (2.69) 
[+74.1 %] 
 +15.95***  (1.40) 
[+67.0 %] 
+14.60***  (2.71) 
[+35.1 %] 
Roosevelt Corollary –0.71**    (0.36) 
[–15.5 %] 
 –1.96**    (1.97) 
[–42.4 %] 
 –0.28        (1.15) 
[–0.1 %] 
–2.31***  (0.22) 
[–30.0 %] 
 –1.19***  (0.30) 
[–23.2 %] 
–0.64        (0.54) 
[–15.2 %] 
Average import share “Airbus” +0.05        (0.04) 
[+0.9 %] 
+0.01        (0.03) 
[+0.2 %] 
 –0.04        (0.07) 
[–0.0 %] 
+0.02        (0.04) 
[+0.3 %] 
 +0.07*        (0.4) 
[+1.4 %] 
+0.04        (0.03) 
[+0.8 %] 
Average export share “Airbus” –0.03        (0.04) 
[–0.6 %] 
+0.00        (0.02) 
[+0.0 %] 
 +0.04        (0.06) 
[+0.3 %] 
–0.01        (0.04) 
[–0.5 %] 
 –0.06        (0.04) 
[–1.1 %] 
–0.05        (0.03) 
[–1.0 %] 
Average import share USA +0.02        (0.02) 
[+0.4 %] 
+0.04        (0.03) 
[+0.7 %] 
 +0.05        (0.08) 
[+0.3 %] 
+0.09***  (0.02) 
[+1.6 %] 
 +0.03        (0.03) 
[+0.7 %] 
–0.04*      (0.02) 
[–0.0.9 %] 
Average export share USA –0.02        (0.02) 
[–0.4 %] 
–0.02        (0.01) 
[–0.3 %] 
 –0.03        (0.05) 
[–0.1 %] 
–0.05***  (0.02) 
[–1.0 %] 
 –0.03        (0.02) 
[–0.5 %] 
+0.03**    (0.01) 
[+0.6 %] 
Average trade surplus “Airbus” +0.00        (0.00) 
[+0.00 %] 
+0.00**    (0.00) 
[+0.0 %] 
 –0.00        (0.00) 
[–0.0 %] 
+0.00        (0.00) 
[+0.0 %] 
 +0.00**    (0.00) 
[+0.0 %] 
+0.00**    (0.00) 
[+0.0 %] 
Average trade surplus USA –0.00        (0.00) 
[–0.0 %] 
–0.00*       (0.00) 
[–0.0 %] 
 +0.00        (0.00) 
[+0.0 %] 
+0.00        (0.00) 
[+0.0 %] 
 –0.00        (0.00) 
[–0.0 %] 
–0.00**    (0.00) 
[–0.0 %] 
Average aid share “Airbus” +0.01        (0.03) 
[+0.0 %] 
+0.00         (0.03) 
[+0.0 %] 
 –0.01        (0.07) 
[–0.1 %] 
–0.04        (0.03) 
[–0.0 %] 
 +0.00        (0.01) 
[+0.1 %] 
–0.02*      (0.01) 
[–0.4 %] 
Average aid share US –0.02        (0.02) 
[–0.4 %] 
–0.00         (0.01) 
[–0.0 %] 
 –0.01        (0.03) 
[–0.0 %] 
+0.03*      (0.01) 
[+0.3 %] 
 –0.02        (0.03) 
[–0.4 %] 
+0.01        (0.02) 
[+0.1 %] 
Constant –68.99**  (27.05) +23.03       (29.99)  –135.88**  (57.86) +22.32      (23.28)  –56.05**  (25.37) +11.48      (24.50) 
         
         
No. of obs. 102 102  95 95  102 102 
Log pseudolikelihood –58.0 –56.1  –23.9 –40.2  –56.8 –60.7 
Pseudo R-squared 0.18 0.16  0.30 0.34  0.19 0.14 
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Notes: The dependent variables are “airline has bought Airbus wide-body aircraft in the defined period” (if yes, then 1; 0 otherwise) and “airline has bought Boeing wide-body 
aircraft in the defined period” (if yes, then 1; 0 otherwise). Maximum-likelihood estimates of logit regression coefficients are given. Clustered robust standard errors are in 
parentheses (clustered is on geographical location). Marginal effects are given in brackets. In case of a dummy variable, the marginal effect is given for the step from 0 to 1. In 
case of a continuous variable, the marginal effect is evaluated at the variable’s mean. 
Sources: Authors’ own estimations. 
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Foundation year:  Consistent across all models is the effect that the younger an airline, the 
significantly more likely it was to buy Airbus; there is no significant effect, however, from the 
perspective of Boeing.37 Together with the variables discussed before, this finding points to 
the importance of path dependency in the airline business and does match with the 
common narrative. Newly founded airlines compiled their fleets from the scratch and were 
not locked-in by earlier decisions in favour of another producer. 
Customer nature variables:38 Pure cargo airlines did not buy the A300/310 at all in the 
period under investigation. The A300 freighter was considerably less attractive than the 
larger freighter versions of the DC-10 and especially the B747 with its nose cargo door. In the 
whole period under consideration, governmental customers were neither particularly 
attached to Airbus nor to Boeing wide-bodies (in the 1980s). Apparently they had a tendency 
for the DC-10 and the Tristar. This result is very possibly driven by the KC-10 freighter based 
on the DC-10-30CF delivered in large numbers to the US Air Force between 1981 and 1990. 
Ownership variables:39 Contrary to our original expectation, which was reinforced by 
the mean comparison test shown in Table 2, an airline’s ownership status was not a prime 
determinant of the decision to go for Airbus wide-body aircraft rather than for the others – 
at least not in the 1970s and from the bird’s eye perspective on the entire observation 
period. That said, state-owned airlines (and such with mixed ownership) were indeed 
significantly more likely than privately-owned airlines to buy Airbus jets in the 1980s.40 
Finally, a note on the switching ownership variable is necessary. Since our design allows for 
only one observation per airline per model, we faced the challenge to assign ownership 
status to Air Canada, BA, JAL, and Philippine Airlines, which switched ownership during the 
observation period (see footnote 25). We solved the issue somewhat imperfectly by 
introducing a fourth ownership dummy. The implication of this variable’s coefficients is 
clear: these airlines (with the exception of Philippine Airlines) bought no Airbus wide-bodies 
at all (at the time). 
                                                          
37
  The marginal effects shown in Table 3 are evaluated at the mean foundation year of (rounded) 1951. 
38
  We dropped the third dummy – passenger airline – to avoid multicollinearity. The dropped dummy variable 
constitutes the base case. 
39
  We dropped the fourth dummy – private ownership – to avoid multicollinearity. The dropped dummy 
variable constitutes the base case. 
40
  Note once again that two prime state-owned customers of Airbus – Air France and Lufthansa – are not 
accounted for in the regressions as they drop out due to the definition of the trade and aid variables. 
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Illustration 6 
The commercial failure of 
the Tristar prompted 
Lockheed to withdraw from 
passenger aircraft 
production in 1985 (250 
delivered between 1972 
and 1985). 
Photo: Cathay Pacific Airways 
 
Colony variables:41 Contrary to our original hypothesis, home countries’ former colonial ties 
significantly reduced the likelihood for airlines to buy Airbus. Airlines from former French 
colonies were significantly less likely to order Airbus aircraft throughout the whole period. 
Our results suggest that Boeing directly benefited from this in the 1970s while likewise 
seeing the likelihood to be bought decreasing significantly in the 1980s. Turning to airlines 
from former British colonies, they were significantly less likely to buy Airbus and Boeing jets 
alike.42 However, looking into the sub-periods, such airlines were not more or less likely to 
buy Airbus (but less likely to turn to Boeing) than airlines the home country of which was a 
former colony in the 1970s. To state it clearly, that was good for Airbus. What seems to have 
been bad for Airbus sales was Great Britain re-entering the Airbus consortium in 1979. This is 
because, in the 1980s, airlines from former British colonies showed a statistically significant 
tendency to avoid buying Airbus aircraft. Given the British government’s general lack of 
support for the Airbus project, this might not surprise. This lack much owes to the fact that 
the Lockheed Tristar was exclusively equipped with Rolls-Royce turbofan engines 
manufactured in England. BA flew the Tristar as did a couple of airlines based in the 
Commonwealth. Thus, what was good for Lockheed was good for Rolls Royce.  
                                                          
41
  We dropped the fourth dummy – airline’s home country never had been a colony of any of the three 
countries – to avoid multicollinearity. The dropped dummy variable constitutes the base case. 
42
  We also ran regressions substituting the former British colony variable for a Commonwealth membership 
variable which, however, does not change the results. Results are available upon request. 
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Finally, having been an airline from a former US colony – in our dataset that is 
Philippine Airlines only – boosted both Airbus and Boeing sales. However, since the United 
States has no extensive history as colonizer, we thought it appropriate to also account for a 
somewhat looser concept of political influence in the geographical neighbourhood. We refer 
here to the 1904 Roosevelt-Corollary – a fundamental change to the Monroe-Doctrine of 
1823 – which stated that the United States are supposed to actively intervene into conflicts 
in Latin America if necessary to restore order (Mitchener/Weidenmier 2005). In contrast to 
our expectations, airlines from Latin America were significantly less likely than airlines from 
the rest of the world to buy Boeing (and also Airbus) aircraft when looking at the full 
observation period. For Boeing, this effect prevails in the 1970s, but vanishes in the 1980s; 
from the perspective of Airbus, this effect sets in in the 1980s.43 To conclude, there indeed 
seems to be a colonial story in the data, but one which stands in contrast to the literature.  
Trade variables:44 We find some evidence that trade structure plays a role in 
determining the decision to buy aircraft. While there is no effect whatsoever in the 
regressions on the full period, trade structure matters especially in the sub-period 
regressions on the decision to buy Boeing wide-bodies. In the 1970s, airlines from countries 
with large imports from but small exports to the United States were more likely to buy 
Boeing; this relation turned upside down in the 1980s. More important for our prime focus, 
though, are the variables on the average net trade surplus. The effects observable for Boeing 
are somewhat counterintuitive as they imply that airlines from countries which exhibited 
large surpluses with the Airbus consortium member countries were more likely to buy 
Boeing and such with a large surplus with the United States were less likely to buy Boeing (in 
the 1980s, and overall). For Airbus, results suggest in line with our expectations on the effect 
that in the 1980s airlines from countries exhibiting a large average trade surplus with the 
Airbus consortium member countries were more likely to buy Airbus at all. This leaves room 
for the interpretation that such countries intended to buy Airbus in order to reduce a high 
surplus so as to avoid trade tensions (like with Japan and the US in the observation period; 
see footnote 19). 
                                                          
43
  The variables takes the value 1 for all airlines from Latin America in our dataset, and zero otherwise. 
44
  The trade structure variables equal the average share in a country’s imports and exports for the respective 
period to which the regressions refer. The same goes for the net trade surplus. 
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Aid variables:45 Our evidence on development aid flows as potential governmental 
leverage to boost Airbus or Boeing sales is very limited. We do not find an effect holding for 
the entire observation period. However, there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the US’ share in aid a country received and the likelihood of an airline to buy 
Boeing in the 1970s. We also find indirect evidence for the 1980s. The higher the Airbus 
consortium member countries’ share in the development aid a country received, the lower 
was the likelihood to buy Boeing whereas the effect on Airbus own sales is not clear. 
 
6. How many sales were political? Establishing a bottom-line 
Based on our evidence from logit regressions, we want to establish a bottom-line, or lower 
bound estimate, for the absolute and relative number of Airbus’s and Boeing’s political sales. 
This exercise can only be a crude approximation to the true number as we solely rely on 
patterns in mass data and not on detailed (archival) information on individual sales. The 
figures we offer in the following should be understood as figures on sales that are especially 
suspicious of having been political sales; we are aware that there certainly is a decent margin 
of error involved.  
Our reasoning is as follows: As we do not want to overstretch our methodology, we 
decided to start from a rather narrow focus when it comes to selecting deliveries being our 
prime suspects for having been political. We therefore restrict ourselves to selecting from 
deliveries to state-owned airlines; as we outlined above, state-ownership is not a necessary 
precondition for a sale to be political, but the likelihood for those sales selected by us to 
have truly been political (as proven by archival research) might rise when sticking to that 
restriction. For illustration, Figure 5 shows the absolute and relative frequency of deliveries 
to state-owned airlines for Airbus and Boeing per year. Until 1981, the proportion of such 
deliveries is generally quite high for both; after 1981, however, the proportion for Boeing 
falls visibly faster than that for Airbus, as mirrored in the regression results. 
 
 
  
                                                          
45
  The variables are defined to be the period average joint share of the Airbus consortium member countries 
and the average share of the United States in a country’s receipts of total official development aid. The cells 
for all donor countries but the five manufacturer countries show a zero; for the latter, the variable is not 
defined.  
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Fig. 5: Deliveries of Boeing and Airbus wide-bodies to state-owned airlines 
 
(a) Absolute number of manufacturer’s deliveries 
 
 
(b) Proportion in manufacturer’s total deliveries (in %) 
 
Sources: Authors’ dataset. 
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Fig. 6: Suspected share of political sales in manufacturers’ own wide-body deliveries by 
category 
 
(a) Airbus (in %) 
 
 
(b) Boeing (in %) 
 
Sources: Authors’ depiction. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 report our guesstimates of political sales. Figure 6 gives the number relative 
to Airbus’s and Boeing’s deliveries by several categories. For Airbus, we counted the 
following deliveries in, step-by-step, avoiding any double counts: First, all deliveries to the 
“Airbus flag carriers” Air France, Iberia, and Lufthansa over 1974-1989 as the baseline; 
second, all deliveries to governmental customers over 1974-1989; third, all deliveries to 
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state-owned airlines from French colonies over 1974-1989 as, given the significantly reduced 
motivation of airlines from former colonies to buy Airbus (see above), the sales that actually 
occurred are especially suspicious to us for being politically forced; and, fourth, all deliveries 
to state-owned airlines over 1980-1989 the home country of which received at least the 
mean share of development aid plus one standard deviation from the Airbus consortium 
member countries (see above).46 We did not include deliveries associated with a large 
average trade surplus (above subsample mean plus one standard deviation) in the 1980s 
(see above) because the airlines from the relevant countries were privately-owned. As is 
evident, the share of political sales in all Airbus deliveries was initially quite high and then 
settled somewhere between ten and thirty percent after 1980. 
With regard to Boeing, we counted the following deliveries in: First; all deliveries by 
British Airways and Japan Airlines (as included in the variable switching ownership) over 
1974-1984, thus, until these two airlines switched from state-owned to privately-owned (BA) 
and, respectively, mixed ownership (JAL);47 second, all deliveries to governmental customers 
over 1974-1989; and, third, all deliveries to airlines in the 1970s, the home country of which 
received more than the subsample mean plus one standard deviation of development aid by 
the United States (see above). For neither Airbus nor Boeing, we included deliveries to 
Philippine airlines as the only former US colony in our dataset because the airline had pretty 
much benefited both equally with orders. It is evident that the share of political sales in all 
Boeing deliveries generally ranged below the proportion observed for Airbus; that the 
composition of sales is more diverse in the 1970s and not in the 1980s like it is for Airbus; 
and that the proportion is generally zero, or close to it (see 1989) after 1984. 
Figure 7 additionally reports the absolute number of deliveries selected (dashed line) 
along with the absolute number of Airbus and Boeing deliveries for comparison (straight 
line). For both manufacturers we arrive at a modest number of between two and eleven 
deliveries per year which are highly suspicious of having been political sales. While the 
                                                          
46
  The mean share in the 1980s subsample is 10.6 percent and the standard deviation is 14.9 percent. 
According to this principle, all deliveries to Emirates, Kuwait Airways, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways, and 
Turkish Airlines are included. 
47
  We did not consider Air Canada here for the reason that there likely is a neighbourhood effect involved. 
British Airways’ lacking support for Airbus and its attraction to the Americans and Japan Airlines’ buys to 
help reduce the Japanese trade surplus with the United States seem to be a baseline of political sales that 
should be considered like the sales to Air France, Iberia, and Lufthansa on Airbus’ side.  
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number of deliveries, on the whole, exhibits a positive trend for both Airbus and Boeing, 
there is no such general increase in political sales. 
 
Fig. 7: Suspected absolute number of political sales compared to manufacturers’ own wide-
body deliveries 
 
(a) Airbus 
 
(b) Boeing 
 
Sources: Authors’ depiction. 
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Fig. 8: Percent share of Airbus’s and Boeing’s political sales in total wide-body deliveries 
 
Sources: Authors’ depiction. 
 
Finally, Figure 8 shows the proportion of both manufacturers’ political sales in total wide-
body jet deliveries between 1974 and 1989 – that is, also including the deliveries by 
Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas. In fact, the proportion never exceeded eleven percent 
(Boeing 1978). It is more volatile for Boeing than for Airbus; and Airbus had more political 
sales than Boeing in the first half of the 1980s. Both manufacturers more or less equalled 
one another in closing (alleged) political sales in the 1970s. However, Airbus kept up 
generating a baseline of political sales in the 1980s which we do not find for Boeing. 
Although our graphical evidence is based on a somewhat elusive concept and is therefore to 
be taken with caution, the broad message regarding the 1980s certainly matches Boeing’s 
critique of Airbus having benefited to a greater extent from political sales as defined in this 
article.  
To conclude, we want to highlight six findings. First, it is worth stressing that our 
analysis revises the traditional picture that it was Airbus’ rise leading to the marginalisation 
of the Tristar and the DC-10 in the first place; in light of our statistical evidence, Boeing 
played an equal part in it. Second, concerning our hypothesis H1.1 – that Airbus was 
significantly more likely to sell to state-owned airlines than to privately-owned –, our 
evidence is rather weak; in breadth, Airbus more likely sold to state-owned airlines in the 
1980s, but this result does not hold for the 1970s and in our model for the full period. Third, 
while there apparently is a colonial story not yet told, it runs in the opposite direction of 
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what we originally expected; so far, our hypothesis H2.1 cannot be accepted in the form we 
stated it. Fourth, as concerns trade relations, we do find some indirect evidence in favour of 
our hypothesis that trading partner taste as well as the potential of trade tensions for the 
inclination to buy aircraft as a countermeasure mattered to some degree (H3.1). Fifth, 
likewise development aid may indeed be taken as workable leverage in the hand of the 
aircraft manufacturer countries. Sixth, further research has, of course, to harden our 
statistical evidence on the incidence of political sales in a more narrow sense. So far, our 
bottom-line guesstimate seems to suggest a rather moderate extent when looking at the 
pure scale – i.e., the proportion of political sales in total wide-body deliveries. 
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Appendix 
 
Fig. A.1: Mean comparison tests for selected binary variables by year – Airbus vs. American 
manufacturers (plotted on the left) and Airbus vs. Boeing (plotted on the right) 
 
(1) Delivery to state-owned airline 
 
(2) Delivery to airline from an Airbus member country 
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(3) Delivery to European airline 
 
(4) Delivery to Central and South American airline 
 
(5) Delivery to North American airline 
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(6) Delivery to African airline 
 
(7) Delivery to Middle Eastern airline 
(8) Delivery to Southern Asian airline 
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(9) Delivery to South Eastern Asian airline 
 
(10) Delivery to Eastern Asian airline 
 
(11) Delivery to Oceanic airline 
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(12) Delivery to airline from a country with former colonial ties to Airbus member states 
 
(13) Delivery to airline from a Commonwealth country 
 
Notes: The blue line reports the difference in mean between the Airbus and the American manufacturer 
samples. A difference of greater than (smaller than) zero implies that the mean in the Airbus (American 
manufacturer) sample is larger than the mean in the American manufacturer (Airbus) sample. Differences 
statistically significant on the ten percent level or better are marked by a dot. The red lines report the upper 
and lower 95-percent confidence intervals. 
Sources: Authors’ own calculations. 
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Tab. A.1: Non-Soviet jet aircraft types entering airline service until 1987 
A 
Aircraft type 
B 
Country 
C 
Inauguration to 
end of production 
D 
Aisles 
E 
Engines and 
position 
F 
max. seats 
G 
max. range (km) 
H 
Total built 
DeHavilland Comet UK 1952-1964 1 4 w(ings) 60-119 2,400-6,900 114 
Sud Aviation Caravelle F 1959-1972 1 2 r(ear) 80-140 1,500-3,600 282 
Boeing B-707 US 1958-1982 1 4 w 179-219 8,000-9,300 763 
Douglas DC-8 US 1959-1972 1 4 w 177-259 5,900-10,800 556 
Boeing B-720 US 1960-1967 1 4 w 165 5,800-6,700 154 
Convair Coronado US 1960-1965 1 4 w 100-149 4,400-5,800 102 
Vickers VC-10 UK 1964-1970 1 4 r 135-176 9,800-11,500 40 
Boeing B-727 US 1964-1984 1 3 r 131-189 3,100-4,000 1,832 
Hawker-Siddeley Trident UK 1964-1978 1 3 r 103-180 2,800-4,600 117 
British Aerospace BAC 1/11 UK 1965-1981 1 2 r 79-119 2,000-3,500 244 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9/MD-80 US 1965-1999 1 2 r 90-172 2,300-3,800 2,167 
Boeing B-737 US 1968-today 1 2 w 124-189 3,400-10,200 10,580
a
 
Boeing B-747 US 1970-today 2 4 w 400-660 9,800-15,400 1,556
a
 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10/MD-11 US 1971-2001 2 2 w + 1 r 380-410 10,000-13,400 586 
Lockheed Tristar US 1972-1984 2 2 w + 1 r 315-400 7,700-9,900 250 
Airbus A300 F/D 1974-2007 2 2 w 345 3,400-7,000 561 
Dassault Mercure F 1974-1975 1 2 w 150 1,700 11 
Aérospatiale/British Aerospace Concorde F/UK 1976-1979 1 4 w 92, 100 6,700 20 
Boeing 767 US 1982-today 2 2 w 290-375 6,000-12,300 1,190
a
 
Boeing 757 US 1983-2004 1 2 w 221-295 5,400-7,300 1,050 
Airbus A310 F/D 1983-1998 2 2 w 280 5,600-9,600 255 
 
Notes: 
a
 As of late June 2020. A: Shown are all Western-built passenger jets used for major routes, thus Fokker F-28/F-100, Canadair or Embraer regional jets are not included. 
Included are all civil variants of a specific type even if produced after 1989. B: Country/countries of main producer(s): D – Germany, F – France, UK – United Kingdom, US – 
United States. C: Ranked according to first regular passenger flight. D: Wide-body aircraft have got two aisles by definition. 
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